The False Dichotomy Between Theory and Skills Training: Why Good Lawyers Need to Pay Attention to Theory by Vitiello, Michael
University of the Pacific
Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship
2017
The False Dichotomy Between Theory and Skills
Training: Why Good Lawyers Need to Pay
Attention to Theory
Michael Vitiello
University of Pacific McGeorge School of Law, mvitiello@pacific.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Legal Education Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information,
please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Vitiello, The False Dichotomy Between Theory and Skills Training: Why Good Lawyers Need to Pay Attention to Theory, 48
The U. of Pac. L. Rev 915 (2017).
  
915
The False Dichotomy Between Theory and Skills Training: 
Why Good Lawyers Need to Pay Attention to Theory 
Michael Vitiello* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, some commentators have singled out theoretical legal 
scholarship as a major problem with legal education.1 To hear some folks talk, 
law professors who approach the law from a theoretical perspective disserve their 
students.2 This criticism comes both from within and outside the academy. Some 
practice-oriented faculty members mock their theoretical colleagues.3 Some 
members of the media have unthinkingly picked up on that mantra.4 
Criticizing legal scholarship is hardly new. As long ago as 1936, for 
example, Yale Law Professor Fred Rodell identified two problems with legal 
scholarship: “One is its style. The other is its content.”5 More recently, prominent 
federal appellate Judge Harry T. Edwards published a number of articles 
critiquing much legal scholarship as unhelpful to the bench and the bar.6 Similar 
attacks on legal scholarship are not hard to find. Chief Justice John Roberts 
joined the chorus when he observed: “Pick up a copy of any law review . . . and 
the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on 
evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which . . . isn’t of 
much help to the bar.”7 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
1. See, e.g., Jill Switzer, Old Lady Lawyer: Effective Lawyering is More Than Just Knowing the Law, 
ABOVE THE LAW (July 13, 2016, 10:44 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/07/old-lady-lawyer-effective-
lawyering-is-more-than-just-knowing-the-law/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(explaining that theoretical understanding is only one of twenty-six identified “effectiveness factors” that 
determine a young attorney’s competency on the job; most of these factors are labeled “non-classroom 
competencies” and are acquired through practice-oriented courses). 
2. See, e.g., id. 
3. See, e.g., id. (“While classroom smarts may get a student law review membership, Order of the Coif 
honors, and other law school distinctions . . . there is an array of other competencies that are just as, if not more, 
important.”). 
4. See, e.g., Katherine Hobson, Law Schools Work to Make Students More Employable, US NEWS (Mar. 
11, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2014/03/11/law-
schools-work-to-make-students-more-employable (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(“[L]aw schools are also reconsidering what they need to be imparting. Many schools have been shifting 
attention to “soft” skills like leadership and teamwork. . . .”). 
5. Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38, 38 (1936). 
6. E.g., Harry T. Edwards, Another Look at Professor Rodell’s Goodbye to Law Reviews Essay, 100 VA. 
L. REV. 1483 (2014). 
7. Kenneth Jost, Roberts’ Ill-Informed Attack on Legal Scholarship, JOST ON JUSTICE (July 19, 2011, 
10:56 AM), http://jostonjustice.blogspot.com/2011/07/roberts-ill-informed-attack-on-legal.html (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (cited in Harry T. Edwards, Essays, Another Look at Professor 
Rodell’s Goodbye to Law Reviews, 100 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1488 n.22 (2014)). When the counsel for the plaintiff 
in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), urged the Court to overrule the Slaughterhouse Cases, Justice 
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One can find critics within the legal academy as well. For example, Professor 
Kenneth Lasson described some legal scholarship as “patronizing and pompous 
patois” and “unintelligible gibberish.”8 Similar criticism makes its way into the 
media as well. In one of a number of articles that he wrote criticizing legal 
education, New York Times writer David Segal wrote snidely about my 
colleague Jay Mootz as follows: “Professors are rewarded for chin-stroking 
scholarship, like law review articles with titles like ‘A Future Foretold: Neo-
Aristotelean Praise of Postmodern Legal Theory.’”9 Some professors, often skills 
professors or clinicians, distinguish themselves from “podium” or “traditional” 
professors by emphasizing that they teach real skills—something their theoretical 
colleagues do not and cannot.10 On some campuses, faculties are deeply divided 
over the relevance of theory to the practice of law.11 
Throughout 40 years of teaching, I have heard some colleagues make 
derogatory comments about the irrelevance of theory. I have always found the 
dichotomy between skills and theory to be overblown and often misleading. I 
should be clear: some legal scholarship is not well written and some theoretical 
scholarship is not much help to anyone—except perhaps to those reviewing a 
professor for tenure.12 And of course, the same might be said about scholarship 
aimed at practitioners. The focus of this paper is on why the dichotomy between 
theory and practical training is a false one. Specifically, I borrow two exercises 
from simulation books that I wrote and use those examples to demonstrate how 
 
Scalia asked why counsel would ask the Court “to overrule 150, 140 years of prior law, when you can reach 
your result under substantive due [process][?]” Reflecting his skepticism about legal scholarship, Justice Scalia 
added, “I mean, you know, unless you’re bucking for a – a place on some law school faculty.” Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 6–7, McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521). 
8. Kenneth Lasson, Commentary, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 926, 943 (1990) (cited in Edwards, supra note 7, at 1488 n.21). 
9. David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers. 
html?_r=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
10. See, e.g., Desiree Moore, Skills Learned in Law School that Actually Translate into an Effective Legal 
Practice, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/publications/tyl/topics/professional-development/skills-learned-
law-school-actually-translate-effective-legal-practice.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2016) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A law school education is a necessary but insufficient foundation for a 
legal career . . . success in a legal career certainly does not turn on these skills.”). Professor Moore teaches 
advanced motion writing and legal writing part-time at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law and is an 
associate dispute resolution attorney at a firm in Chicago. Part-time Faculty, LOY. UNIV. CHI., 
http://luc.edu/law/parttime/mooredesiree.shtml (last visited Aug. 12, 2016) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
11. Compare Ken Gormley, A Response to ‘Dr. No’, THE PENNSYLVANIA LAWYER 24 (Jan. 2012), 
available at http://webspace.ship.edu/SBLichtman/documents/Pro-Con%20on%20Law%20School%20 
(PA%20Lawyer).pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Turning first year into a trade 
school, like a plumber’s workshop filled with pipe-wrenches and toolboxes, without the academic/analytical 
component would send legal education back to the Dark Ages.”), with Switzer, supra note 1 (“While classroom 
smarts may get a student law review membership, Order of the Coif honors, and other law school 
distinctions . . . there is an array of other competencies that are just as, if not more, important.”) 
12. Lasson, supra note 8, at 927, 936. 
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practicing lawyers need to understand theory to make competent arguments. The 
first example is from criminal law and involves theories of punishment.13 Lest 
readers believe that I chose low hanging fruit, I use a second example from civil 
procedure and the pleading requirements for a complaint filed in federal court.14 
II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 
Not long ago, I gave a presentation at a conference on teaching skills and 
integrating experiential teaching exercises into the traditional classroom. By way 
of introduction, one of the organizers made a sharp distinction between teaching 
skills (a good thing) and teaching theory (in context, seemingly a bad thing). 
Perhaps I was overly sensitive on the subject, but for several years, I bristled 
when I have read critiques of American law schools as places where we teach 
meaningless theory at the expense of practical training. As David Segal wrote in 
the New York Times, the legal academy has emphasized “the theoretical over the 
useful,” and classes “are often overstuffed with antiquated distinctions.”15 
As I began my presentation, I made clear that it argued a contrary point: that 
theory matters. And I designed my presentation to show audience members one 
such example. I borrowed heavily from an exercise that Professor Emily Hughes 
and I included in our Bridge to Practice book, Criminal Law Simulations.16 We 
modeled the simulation in our book on the facts of Lockyer v. Andrade,17 a case 
in which the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of 50 years to life for 
two acts of petty theft under California’s Three Strikes law.18 That we used a real 
case is important, as developed below.19 
The simulation problem includes a probation report that develops the 
offender’s personal history. Readers familiar with the criminal justice system will 
recognize common aspects of the offender’s background: a destructive family 
life; a stint in foster care; a long history of mostly petty offenses; a stint in the 
military; periods of incarceration; periods of probation ended with violations of 
probation; and drug addiction with unsuccessful efforts at getting clean.20 In 
 
13. MICHAEL VITIELLO & EMILY HUGHES, CRIMINAL LAW SIMULATIONS 1–12 (2015). 
14. MICHAEL VITIELLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE SIMULATIONS 76–95 (2012). 
15. Segal, supra note 9. 
16. I have included the material that I used at the conference as an appendix to this article. 
17. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2016) (in 2012, California voters approved Proposition 36, which 
limited the three strikes law so that the third felony has to be at least a serious one as defined in California Penal 
Code sections 1192.7(c) and 1192.8(a); thus, the statute would no longer be applicable in this case). 
19. Infra Part II. 
20. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 376 (2005) (defendant had prior convictions, brain 
damage, and resultant mental illness from fetal alcohol syndrome, and often abused alcohol); Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302, 308–09 (1989) (defendant had an “abused childhood” and suffered from mental disease); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (defendant had previously committed burglaries and was 
under “extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family” during commission of the charged crimes). 
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addition, the offender developed a morphine addiction while he was in the 
military.21 Also included is a recommendation from the probation officer. The 
assignment includes sentencing options under the hypothetical Penal Code 
(modeled on California’s law). The sentencing judge has the option of striking 
prior felonies and treating the charges as misdemeanors, in which case the 
sentence could be up to six months in jail.22 At the other extreme, the judge could 
treat both misdemeanors as felonies—under the governing law, a petty theft-
with-a-prior-theft may be treated as a felony—and then sentence the offender to 
two consecutive minimum terms of 25 years to life.23 Thus, as in Andrade, the 
judge could sentence the offender to 50 years to life.24 
The assignment also includes a statutory provision, borrowed from California 
law, setting out the objectives that the sentencing judge should attempt to achieve 
in setting a term of imprisonment.25 Readers familiar with criminal law will 
recognize the usual suspects (punishment, specific and general deterrence, and 
incapacitation) along with a few other goals, including restitution and equality 
among similarly situated offenders. Finally, the assignment explains that the 
judge for whom students are working wants a recommendation of an appropriate 
sentence and a justification for that recommendation. 
This simulation evolved out of my experience as a criminal law professor. 
Like many criminal law professors, I find the subject to be of great interest, in 
part because of the philosophical questions embedded within so much doctrine. 
Most modern criminal law casebooks begin with a chapter on purposes of 
punishment and appropriate sentences. For example, two of the leading books I 
have used, Dressler and Garvey’s Cases and Materials on Criminal Law26 and 
Kadish, Schulhofer, Steiker, and Barkow’s Criminal Law and Its Processes: 
Cases and Materials,27 include excerpts from several philosophers and scholars 
about why we punish and how much punishment is appropriate. Students often 
struggled with the material; some clearly doubted the utility of philosophy. After 
all, some students claimed that they wanted to be prosecutors or public defenders 
and could see little use for theory. 
The idea for the simulation germinated further when Charles Clark, the Chief 
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, appointed me 
as counsel for Ricky Terrebonne, a prisoner in Louisiana’s state prison.28 When 
 
21. See, e.g., Webster v. Chappell, No. 93-306 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77583, at •100–03 (E.D. Cal. June 
4, 2014) (petitioner developed a morphine addiction during his service in the Vietnam War). 
22. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(2). 
23. PENAL CODE §§ 666, 667. 
24. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 68 (2003). 
25. CAL. R. CT. 4.410(a). 
26. JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (6th ed. 
2012). 
27. SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CAROL S. STEIKER & RACHEL E. BARKOW, 
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 2012). 
28. Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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he was twenty-one years old and addicted to heroin, Terrebonne arranged a drug 
buy for two undercover agents in exchange for three bindles of heroin.29 As a 
result, he received a true life sentence under Louisiana’s draconian drug law.30 
The case posed the question whether a true life sentence was grossly 
disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment.31 In researching the relevant case law, I realized that 
philosophical concerns about why we punish were relevant to the legal issue 
before the court. 
By the time I began working on the Bridge to Practice chapter, I had been 
writing about California’s Three Strikes law, raising doubts about its efficacy by 
referencing the underlying justifications of punishment.32 The Supreme Court 
had decided Andrade33 and Ewing v. California,34 5–4 decisions upholding 
extreme sentences imposed under California’s Three Strikes law. Andrade’s facts 
proved ideal for posing hard questions about society’s justifications for prison 
sentences.35 
To make that point, read the simulation exercise in the appendix and consider 
the kinds of arguments one might make to justify a particular sentence. Many 
students justify the death penalty in homicide cases by referencing the simple 
retributive idea that one must forfeit a life for a life.36 In the simulation, one can 
explore how that principle of equivalency works. Few students want to hold on to 
the literal application of the equivalency principle. Compelling the hypothetical 
defendant to return the stolen DVDs seems inadequate.37 Most students believe 
that society needs to impose a greater punishment on a thief than the mere return 
of the property. 
 
29. Id. at 501. 
30. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 (2016) (in 2009, the law was changed from life imprisonment to anywhere 
between five and fifty years of hard labor); Terrebonne, 848 F.2d at 507. 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Terrebone, 848 F.2d at 502. 
32. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out: Was Judicial Activism 
California’s Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025 (2004); Michael Vitiello, Reforming Three Strikes’ 
Excesses, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (2004); Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1997). 
33. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
34. 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
35. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003). The cases presented the Court with different issues. 
Andrade arose under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, and 28 
U.S.C.S. § 2241. As a result, counsel for Andrade had to argue that the state court decision denying relief was 
an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The five-justice majority found 
that the controlling case law was not sufficiently well-established. Id. at 69–70. Ewing came to the Court on the 
writ of certiorari from the denial of Ewing’s claim in the state court system on direct appeal. Thus, that case 
posed the question whether his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment. A deeply divided Court found that his sentence did not do so. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30–31. 
36. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 333 n.41 (1972) (“The Code of Hammurabi is one of the 
first known laws to have recognized the concept of an ‘eye for an eye,’ and consequently to have accepted death 
as an appropriate punishment for homicide.”). 
37. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 52–54 (6th ed. 2012). 
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What about general deterrence in the simulation exercise? The simulation 
allows exploration of a number of issues relating to deterrence. A central issue is 
whether the threat of severe punishment deters. Empirical studies suggest that the 
certainty of punishment is far more important to deterring crime than is the 
severity of punishment.38 This leads to an inquiry about resource allocation: if 
certainty of punishment is more important than severity, does incarcerating the 
hypothetical defendant for 50 years to life make sense?39 Absent unlimited 
resources, society is making a choice between prison space and law 
enforcement.40 
Proponents of California’s Three Strikes law justified its passage as a way to 
incapacitate high-risk offenders.41 (That rationale expanded shortly after its 
passage because incapacitation did not seem to be a sufficient explanation for 
what proponents claimed was its immediate success.)42 The simulation exercise 
allows discussion of that justification as well—the facts are set up to suggest that 
the hypothetical defendant failed drug treatment in the past, and as a result, he 
may be a continuing risk to society. As such, prison, even a long prison term, 
may be necessary for specific deterrence. Similarly, incapacitation may be the 
only way to protect society. These facts invite additional questions. 
Utilitarian theory is empirical; punishment is a form of harm, justified only 
if, on balance, it produces greater social good.43 Is it necessary to warehouse the 
hypothetical defendant for 50 years to protect society? The example allows a 
discussion of studies that suggest offenders commit fewer crimes as they age, a 
fact that is especially true for violent offenders.44 One can also quantify the cost 
of 50 years in a prison. In California, for example, the annual cost for an offender 
is more than $70,000, increasing as offenders age when they are likely to need 
more healthcare.45 Harder to quantify is the human cost to the offender (and 
 
38. See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal 
Sanction Threats Into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 873 (2001) 
(“[T]he disutility of crime increases with . . . the certainty of punishment.”) 
39. Michael Vitiello, Reforming California Sentencing Practice and Policy: Are We There Yet?, 46 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 685, 689 (2014); see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, 
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY 94–96 (2001). 
40. See ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 39, at 17–18. 
41. Id. at 3–7. 
42. See id. at 221–22. 
43. See generally JOHN STUART MILL & JEREMY BENTHAM, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS (Alan 
Ryan ed., 1987). 
44. Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out, supra note 32, at 1084–85; see also Christine 
Herrman et al., Report of the Vera Institute of Justice to the Tennessee Governor’s Task Force on Sentencing 
and Recidivism, VERA INST. OF JUST. 31 (June 6, 2015), available at http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/ 
files/resources/downloads/tennessee-governors-task-force-sentencing-corrections-vera-report.pdf (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
45. How Much Does It Cost to Incarcerate an Inmate?, LEG. ANALYST’S OFF. http://www.lao. 
ca.gov/PolicyAreas/CJ/6_cj_inmatecost (last visited Aug. 21, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
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perhaps his family).46 Balanced against that is the cost of the offender’s future 
criminal conduct, a speculative figure at best. One measure of that cost is the 
nature of the hypothetical offender’s conduct in the simulation exercise. He is a 
petty thief, guilty of shoplifting several DVDs. That seems like a trivial sum.47 
On the same side of the ledger is the cost to the store associated with preventing 
shoplifting. Again, from a utilitarian perspective, which way does the balance 
shift? How much should taxpayers spend to protect store owners from 
shoplifting? Are store owners able to prevent crime more efficiently by putting 
security measures in place?48 
To this point, you can see that easy answers are not likely to work well. At a 
minimum, the retributivist and utilitarian justifications may—as they often do—
point in different directions.49 So do arguments based on the need for 
incapacitation.50 
The hypothetical statute requires additional inquiries before a judge can 
impose a sentence. Here, early detection by store employees prevented the loss. 
One can explore how incarceration is often flatly inconsistent with restitution. 
Offenders in prison are seldom in a position to pay for the harm caused by their 
criminal activity.51 
Also relevant under the statute is ensuring the sentence is similar to other 
offenders similarly situated. Facts in the simulation allow students to focus on 
one of the most important debates about punishment over the past 40 plus years. 
Are offender characteristics relevant,52 or should the sentencing court look only 
to the nature of the offense?53 
I included a number of offender characteristics that students may focus on. 
For example, how important should it be that an offender served in the United 
States Army? How important is a disastrous family history or failed drug 
treatment in the past? Focusing on facts like those allows a discussion of the 
 
46. See, e.g., Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on Families, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTS, 
http://ellabakercenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/who-pays.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2016) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
47. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66–67 (2003) (the value of all of the DVDs totaled $153.54). 
48. See Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of 
Crime Control, 94 YALE L. J. 315, 316, 321 (1984). 
49. DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 14–22. 
50. See generally Norval Morris, The Case for Intermediate Punishment, 2 FED. PRISONS J. 11 (1991); 
Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1985). 
51. See Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 9, 2015), 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
52. Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out, supra note 32, at 1062, 1064; Michael Vitiello, 
Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1028, 1047, 1051 (1991). See also MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 6B.06 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2016) (“[T]he personal characteristics of offenders may be 
included as considerations within the guidelines when indicative of circumstances of hardship, deprivation, 
vulnerability, or handicap, but only as grounds to reduce the severity of sentences that would otherwise be 
recommended.”). 
53. Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, supra note 52, at 1051. 
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continuing debate among scholars, sentencing commissions, and legislators about 
the meaning of treating similarly situated offenders in a similar manner. Much of 
the emphasis in the 1970s, the era when many states abandoned indeterminate 
sentences, was on the need to treat offenders the same when they committed 
similar offenses.54 By comparison, rehabilitation and indeterminate sentencing 
focused on the offender’s capacity for reform.55  Focusing on offender 
characteristics makes sense from a number of perspectives. Society does not need 
to incarcerate an offender for social protection if he is amenable to 
rehabilitation.56 An offender’s personal history may reduce his culpability—for 
example, a person who grew up in an abusive setting is arguably less culpable 
than a person who grew up without such impairment.57 But the abused person 
may be harder to rehabilitate. The ongoing debate about offender characteristics 
demonstrates how determining sentences based on offender characteristics may 
result in racial discrimination.58 For example, white offenders may attain higher 
educational levels than minorities and may have more intact families to provide 
support.59 Attention to future dangerousness (often the reason for considering 
offender characteristics) raises concerns as well.60 Predicting future criminal 
conduct is speculative;61 in addition, relying on potential conduct is punishing 
someone for something that he may well not do.62 
Ignoring offender characteristics has some advantages. It allows a judge to 
compare sentences to assure that they are comparable among offenders 
committing the same crime.63 But it also leads to a great deal of unnecessary 
expense. If sentencing guidelines or a sentencing court relies on good data to 
determine the future dangerousness of individual offenders, society avoids 
significant prison costs.64 Offenders can reenter the work force and may be able 
to reunite with their families.65 
Cycle back to the hypothetical state penal code in the simulation. It instructs 
the court to focus on multiple factors to assess an appropriate sentence. At some 
 
54. Id. at 1012–13, 1015. 
55. Id. at 1016–17, 1053–54. 
56. See id. at 1034–35, 1036 n.186. 
57. Id. at 1026, 1028–29. 
58. See id. at 1052. 
59. Id. at 1052; see also id. at 1028 n.124 (explaining how the Federal Sentencing Guidelines specifically 
exclude from consideration education and family ties, among other factors). 
60. Id. at 1052 n. 275. 
61. Id. at 1036; see also Nathan James, Risk and Needs Assessment in the Criminal Justice System, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV. 1–2 (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44087.pdf (on file with the University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
62. See Vitiello, Can We Return to Rationality?, supra note 32, at 428 n.125. 
63. Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, supra note 52, at 1028. 
64. See Vitiello, Are We There Yet?, supra note 39, at 689–90 n.41; Vitiello, Reconsidering 
Rehabilitation, supra note 52, at 1052–53. 
65. See Vitiello, Are We There Yet?, supra note 39, at 700–01. 
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level, that is intuitively appealing because one is not limited to a simplistic 
retributive formula for assessing punishment.66 One can argue for a longer 
sentence, perhaps, in light of the need for deterrence. But at the end of the day, 
focusing on multiple justifications for punishment leaves the court with little 
guidance.67 
Given the competing sentencing aims available in the simulation, can one 
justify the longest penalties, here 50 years to life? That leads to yet another 
discussion. Many prominent scholars have argued that society may have many 
legitimate sentencing aims, but that proportionality works as an outer limit on an 
appropriate sentence.68 
By this time in the simulation, students should recognize that they have been 
arguing about purposes of punishment. Not only that, but at least in the 
casebooks I have used, students are now ready to turn to cases where the 
Supreme Court has weighed in on all of this. For example, Dressler and Garvey’s 
casebook includes Coker v. Georgia69 and Ewing v. California70 in a section on 
proportionality.71 
Anyone familiar with the Supreme Court’s death penalty case law recognizes 
that it has adopted a form of retributive punishment.72 Only where an offender 
has taken a life (with perhaps some narrow exceptions) may the offender be 
executed.73 Thus, a state is not free to impose the death penalty merely because 
such a severe punishment may deter others from committing similar crimes.74 
 
66. See discussion supra Part II. 
67. See, e.g., DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 26, at 51–61 (documenting the controversy surrounding 
People v. Du, No. BA037738 (Cal. 1991), where the trial judge sentenced the defendant to a total of ten years 
for voluntary manslaughter and use of a gun in the commission of a felony, but then suspended the sentence and 
placed the defendant on probation in consideration of California’s sentencing objectives). 
68. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) cmts. a, b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2016) (describing 
how the revisions “continue the Code’s endorsement of utilitarian crime-reductive purposes, including offender 
rehabilitation and the incapacitation of dangerous offenders, but incorporate[] meaningful proportionality 
limitations not envisioned in the original Code.”) See also DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 49–65; Morris, The 
Case for Intermediate Punishment, supra note 50, at 13 (“Proportionality in punishments requires that 
punishments be fashioned within a limit of what is deserved (that is, they must not be excessive) and they must 
be attuned to the moral and social circumstances of the offender.”) 
69. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
70. 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
71. DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 26, at 69–91. 
72. DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 56–59 (describing the Court’s reasoning in both Coker v. Georgia and 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, as “principally emphasiz[ing] the retributive-based lex talionis concept.”). 
73. Coker, 433 U.S. at 600 (finding the death penalty to constitute disproportional punishment for 
conviction of rape of an adult woman); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008) (same for a conviction 
of child rape). 
74. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 619 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing against the majority that “[i]t is, after 
all, not irrational—nor constitutionally impermissible—for a legislature to make the penalty more severe than 
the criminal act it punishes in the hope it would deter wrongdoing.”) 
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That is not the case when the state does not seek the death penalty, but 
instead imposes a term of imprisonment.75 In that scenario, in a series of cases 
dating back to the 1980s, the Court determined whether the penalty is grossly 
disproportionate.76 That requires comparing the gravity of the offense (measured 
by the harm to society and the culpability of the offender) with the severity of the 
sentence.77 Among other considerations, the Court has also emphasized that the 
Eighth Amendment does not compel states to adhere to any particular 
penological theory.78 Subsequent cases narrowed Solem. But a majority of the 
Court continues to focus on that basic framework.79 Pull back and compare Coker 
and Ewing. Understanding those cases requires students to know something 
about theories of punishment. Coker adopts a retributive principle—a state may 
not execute a rapist; to do so would exceed the eye-for-an-eye principle.80 This 
applies even if the state asserts its need to deter rape by imposing the death 
penalty.81 By comparison, Ewing allows the state great latitude in choosing 
sentences based on various penological goals, like deterrence.82 The Eighth 
Amendment works only as a limiting principle if the underlying sentence is so 
grossly out of line with the underlying crime. 
When I teach these cases and the simulation exercise, I underscore that 
competent counsel had to have some basic understanding of theories of 
punishment to have engaged the Court in a meaningful discussion of the key 
legal issue in the case. Because my co-author and I based the simulation exercise 
 
75. Michael Vitiello, The Expanding Use of Genetic and Psychological Evidence: Finding Coherence in 
the Criminal Law?, 14 NEV. L.J. 897, 908–10 (2014). 
76. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983) (holding grossly disproportionate the defendant’s life 
sentence for issuing a “no account” check for $100, his seventh nonviolent felony conviction); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 (1991) (upholding defendant’s true life sentence for his conviction of 
possession of over 650 grams of cocaine); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (upholding sentence of 
25 years to life under California’s three strikes law for defendant’s felony grand theft conviction for stealing 
$1,200 worth of merchandise). 
77. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290–91; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1022–23; Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22–23. 
78. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289–90 (“‘[O]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the 
proportionality of particular sentences will be exceedingly rare.’” (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 
272 (1980))); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989–990 (“[T]he character of the sentences imposed by other States for the 
same crime . . . has no conceivable relevance to the Eighth Amendment.”); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25–26 (“Our 
traditional deference to legislative policy choice finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution ‘does not 
mandate adoption of any one penological theory.’” (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring))). 
79. Vitiello, The Expanding Use of Genetic and Psychological Evidence: Finding Coherence in the 
Criminal Law?, supra note 75, at 912. 
80. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 620 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s reasoning, 
Justice Powell wrote, “As a matter of constitutional principle, that test [whether the punishment imposed is 
grossly disproportionate to the evil committed by the perpetrator] cannot have the primitive simplicity of ‘life 
for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth.’”) 
81. Id. at 621. 
82. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29 (“To give full effect to the State’s choice of this legitimate penological goal, 
our proportionality review of [a defendant’s] sentence must take that goal into account.”) 
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on Andrade, I emphasize that practicing attorneys must understand theory in real 
cases. 
III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLEADING 
You may contend that I was cherry-picking by choosing the previous 
example. Teaching criminal law without any reference to the purposes of 
punishment is possible, but deprives students of important insights. In this 
section, I take up a very different simulation exercise to demonstrate how theory 
animates civil procedure. To make the case as strongly as possible, this section 
discusses the federal pleading rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).83 
When I took my first teaching position in 1977, the associate dean told me 
that, in addition to my preferred courses, Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, 
I would be teaching Civil Procedure. Like many of my students, I did not 
consider Civil Procedure a course where theory would have much importance. 
Little did I know? Fast-forward several years. 
By the 1990s, I had been teaching Civil Procedure for over a decade and had 
come to recognize the dynamic nature of the material. I also recognized that 
many students had trouble understanding its dynamism. Often, their eyes glazed 
over when we discussed topics like minimum contacts, general jurisdiction, or 
transfer of venue. I committed then to integrating practical skills exercises into 
the traditional classroom. 
More recently, I wrote Bridge to Practice: Civil Procedure Simulations as a 
way to bring the subject to life.84 One of the chapters involves federal pleading, 
for many a topic as dry as it gets.85 And yet, as proceduralists understand, the 
choice of pleading rules demonstrates drafters’ important policy preferences. 
Access to courts and the rule of law are at stake when drafters make those 
choices.86 
A short history of pleading demonstrates that point. The writ system was the 
first major pleading system in the United States.87 Under that system, a plaintiff 
purchased a particular writ—for example, the writ of trespass or the writ of 
trespass on the case—based on the nature of the plaintiff’s claim or claims.88 
Thus, if a plaintiff wanted to sue the defendant for an act of trespass on land, 
assault, battery, false imprisonment, or trespass to chattel, the plaintiff selected 
 
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
84. VITIELLO & HUGHES, supra note 13. 
85. Id. at 76–85. 
86. See, e.g., MICHAEL VITIELLO, ANIMATING CIVIL PROCEDURE (2017); see generally, SARAH STASZAK, 
NO DAY IN COURT (2015). 
87. See WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 30 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th 
ed. 1984). 
88. Id. 
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the writ of trespass.89 A plaintiff could join as many trespass torts as the plaintiff 
had against the defendant without regard to any transactional relationship among 
those claims.90 But if a plaintiff had a claim that might be based on a theory of 
trespass or negligence, the plaintiff could not advance both theories in the same 
case.91 Thus, imagine a case in which a man makes a pass at a woman who 
recoils from his attempt and hits her head on a sharp object. Should she seek a 
writ of trespass because the man’s conduct amounted to a battery? Or should she 
seek the writ of trespass because her injuries resulted from his negligence? 
Further recognize that choosing the wrong writ will leave the plaintiff without a 
remedy.92 
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, most states rejected the writ system 
for a pleading code based on the Field Code, the product of David Dudley Field’s 
efforts.93 The Field Code modernized pleading, requiring that the plaintiff’s 
complaint include facts sufficient to state a cause of action.94 Under Code 
pleading, fewer cases would turn on technical pleading than under the writ 
system.95 More important was whether a defendant had fair notice of the 
plaintiff’s claim.96 
Civil Procedure students and practitioners in states that still adhere to Code 
pleading recognize that the hoped-for simplicity in Code pleading did not always 
come to fruition.97 Most Civil Procedure casebooks include a section on Code 
pleading.98 Often editors include examples from different states where the 
pleaders included similar allegations.99 In one state, for example, a court may 
characterize the pleader’s allegations as legal conclusions, not ultimate facts, and 
hold that the pleading is improper.100 Another court might find a similar pleading 
sufficient.101 Alternatively, a court might hold that a plaintiff alleged evidentiary 
 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 29. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 249–50 (5th ed. 
2015). 
94. Id. at 249 (The plaintiff must include in the complaint “a plain and concise statement of the facts 
constituting a cause of action without unnecessary repetition. . . . “) 
95. Id. at 249–50. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. See, e.g., STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINOW, MARK S. BRODIN, THOMAS O. MAIN & 
ALEXANDRA D. LAHAV, CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 302–06 (4th ed. 2012). 
99. See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 254 (“Courts have often not agreed on whether a 
particular allegation is or is not an ultimate fact.”) 
100. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 128 S.E.2d 762, 765 (N.C. 1963). 
101. See, e.g., Robinson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 278 A.2d 71 (Md. 1971). 
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facts, not ultimate facts, and dismiss the pleading as insufficient.102 In some 
instances, courts have dismissed on such highly technical grounds even when the 
defendant must be fully aware of the nature of the case against it.103 
Occasionally, a court has reversed a jury verdict on appeal even though the 
defendant had full awareness of the nature of the claim and was able to defend at 
trial.104 Courts read a party’s pleading strictly against that party.105 Obviously, 
many cases turned on a litigant’s ability to hire a skilled lawyer rather than on the 
merits of the claim.106 
In the early twentieth century, the then-conservative American Bar 
Association lobbied for liberalized pleading, in part, because many of its 
members practiced in business-friendly federal courts.107 Congress rejected those 
efforts.108 During the Depression, however, progressive academic lawyers pushed 
for the creation of a set of federal rules.109 
Among the primary drafters were men like Charles Clark, the Dean of the 
Yale Law School and then-federal district court judge.110 Advocates like Clark 
saw liberalized pleading as instrumental in allowing injured parties ready access 
to the federal courts.111 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) demonstrates that policy choice. It 
provides simply that a pleader must include a short plain statement of the claim 
that shows that the pleader is entitled to relief.112 Quite intentionally, the drafters 
did not use the confusing terms “cause of action” and “facts.”113 In addition, the 
drafters included sample forms as models.114 Rule 84 made explicit that 
 
102. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 256 (“[S]ome courts have treated a conclusion of law as a 
nonexistent allegation.”); see also RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 293–94 (6th ed. 2012). 
103. See, e.g., Gillispie, 128 S.E.2d at 765 (dismissing a complaint for failure to state a legally cognizable 
claim even though the pleading specified that the defendants “without cause or just excuse and maliciously . . . 
trespassed upon the premises occupied by the plaintiff as a residence, and by the use of harsh language and 
threatening language and physical force directed against the plaintiff assaulted the plaintiff and placed her in 
great fear.”) 
104. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 256. 
105. See id. at 253–57. 
106. See id. at 254 (“Shifting the focus of procedure away from the just resolution of matters on their 
substantive merits to technical decisions as to the form of statements made in the complaint or answer is the 
very antithesis of the result desired from pleading reform.”). 
107. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 28–31 (2000). 
108. Id. at 31. 
109. Id. at 31, 37. 
110. Id. at 31–32. 
111. Id. 
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“[A] claim for relief must contain: . . . a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . . “) 
113. Cf. id. 
114. FED. R. CIV. P. RULES APPENDIX OF FORMS. 
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compliance with the forms was sufficient to state a claim.115 The form for stating 
a negligence claim showed that alleging that the defendant drove his vehicle 
negligently was sufficient—unlike pleading in Code states where courts found 
“negligence” to be a legal conclusion.116 Further, case law made clear that courts 
should read the pleading in the light most favorable to the pleader, not the party 
who moved to dismiss on grounds that the pleadings failed to state a claim for 
relief.117 
Liberal discovery, also part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was 
another policy-driven choice.118 Allowing a plaintiff to avoid dismissal based on 
fairly minimal pleading gave the plaintiff the opportunity to seek discovery from 
the defendant.119 Unlike other judicial systems, the Federal Rules allow a party to 
seek information from his opponents that proves his own case against them.120 
Read together, liberal pleading and liberal discovery facilitate access to the court 
system, where the factfinder should decide the case on the merits, rather than on 
gamesmanship.121 A system where hyper-technical rules result in cases being 
dismissed favors parties with the funds to hire the best lawyers, typically large 
corporate defendants.122 
Not surprisingly, business interests and conservative organizations have 
attempted to unravel this scheme.123 Until the first decade of twenty-first century, 
the Court largely resisted efforts to alter liberal pleading.124 That was the case 
even when lower courts created rules aimed at heightening pleading in classes of 
cases, like civil rights cases.125 That changed in 2007, when the Court decided 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly.126 There, the plaintiffs brought an antitrust claim 
action against the Baby Bells and alleged that the Baby Bells conspired not to 
compete.127 The district court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a 
decision reversed by the court of appeals.128 The Supreme Court reversed.129 
 
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (repealed 2015) (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and 
illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”). 
116. FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 11 (“On [date], at [place], the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle 
against the plaintiff.”). 
117. See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 220–21. 
118. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 580–86 (7th ed. 2011). 
119. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 380. 
120. THOMAS O. MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 34 (2005). 
121. See Justice Larry V. Starcher, A Judicial Philosophy: People-Oriented Justice, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 
411, 443 (2009). 
122. See Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 
309 (2002). 
123. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 118, at 580–86. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
127. Id. at 550–51. Reading the opinion without reading the complaint might lead the reader to assume 
that was all that the plaintiffs alleged. In fact, the complaint contained additional allegations in support of the 
claim of a conspiracy. Id. (“[The defendant’s] actions allegedly included making unfair agreements with the 
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Justice Souter’s opinion created a great deal of uncertainty among scholars 
and lower courts.130 Figuring out exactly why the complaint failed was not 
difficult. He seemed to suggest that the problem with the complaint was that it 
did not include sufficient facts or evidence tending to prove the pleader’s case.131 
He seemed to characterize the allegation of a “conspiracy” as a legal conclusion, 
which was insufficient.132 Instead, a pleader must include “enough factual 
material (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”133 He also tried 
to explain that he was not reverting to the Code distinctions between evidentiary 
facts, ultimate facts, and legal conclusions.134 But distinctions that he drew, as 
well as other statements in the opinion, were hardly convincing.135 
Some commentators believed that Twombly was limited to antitrust cases 
where the substantive standard required additional proof at trial beyond mere 
parallel conduct among defendants.136 Such a narrow reading proved wrong two 
years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.137 
Iqbal sued, among others, Attorney General Ashcroft and F.B.I. Director 
Mueller for discriminatory policies put in place after the 9/11 attack in New 
York.138 In affirming dismissal of the claim without an opportunity for discovery, 
the Supreme Court laid out the blackletter law. Justice Kennedy stated that 
Twombly rested on two underlying principles: first, the policy that “a court must 
accept as true all of the allegations in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”139 A court is “not bound to 
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Second, 
“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to 
dismiss.”140 Anyone familiar with the history leading to the adoption of the 
 
CLECs for access to ILEC networks, providing inferior connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing 
in ways designed to sabotage the CLECs’ relations with their own customers.”) 
128. Id. at 552–53. 
129. Id. at 553. 
130. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 264. 
131. VITIELLO, ANIMATING CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 86. 
132. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
133. Id. at 556. 
134. Id. at 558. 
135. Id. 
136. See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (using Conley v. Gibson language as the pleading 
standard with no mention of “plausibility”). 
137. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
138. Id. at 662. 
139. Id. at 678. 
140. Id. at 679. 
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Federal Rules must recognize that the Court has rewritten the meaning of Rule 
8(a)(2).141 
Twombly and Iqbal generated extensive debate among academic scholars and 
confusion and dissent among lower courts.142 Obviously, something exciting is 
going on in those cases. I attempted to capture some of that excitement in a 
simulation chapter in the Bridge to Practice book.143 
There, the plaintiff was attempting to prevent an internet journalist from 
publishing an article that she believed would invade her privacy.144 She is unsure 
how the journalist gained access to the information about her, but believes that 
the journalist may have conspired with her fellow employee.145 Her complaint 
alleges, among other things, that the defendant and her fellow employee 
conspired to invade her right to privacy.146 One way to use the simulation is to 
have students prepare a memorandum to the judge who must decide whether to 
grant the motion. 
The complaint includes virtually no facts besides the plaintiff’s allegation 
that the defendant conspired.147 Many students apply the blackletter law quite 
literally. Thus, consistent with Iqbal, students argue that the court should ignore 
the allegation of a conspiracy because it is a legal conclusion “couched as a 
factual allegation.” Then, with no facts supporting the claim beyond the 
allegation, students argue that the complaint does not include a plausible claim 
for relief. 
So much more is going on in the simulation than many students recognize. 
Reframed, good lawyers must do far more than argue a mechanical application of 
the blackletter law. There is one obvious way for students to distinguish the facts 
in the simulation from those in Twombly. They can compare Justice Souter’s 
discussion of the problems with forcing the defendants to respond to the 
complaint with the facts of the simulation. Justice Souter noted that part of the 
problem with the complaint’s general allegation of a conspiracy was that the 
defendants would be forced to examine records over several years to find when 
any agreement may have taken place.148 He commented on the enormous cost of 
that kind of discovery.149 The simulation involves no similar problem with overly 
broad discovery requests. 
 
141. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“[A] claim for relief must contain: . . . a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .”), with Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (“[O]nly a complaint 
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”) 
142. FRIENDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 264. 
143. VITIELLO, ANIMATING CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 86, at 76–85. 
144. Id. at 2. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 80. 
147. Id. at 80–83. 
148. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–59 (2007). 
149. Id. 
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The previous point involves lawyer-like ability to distinguish cases. It does 
not, without more, demonstrate how theory advances advocacy. But think more 
about the simulation hypothetical and the discussion of why the drafters of the 
rules chose liberal pleading. They favored “the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
resolution of disputes,”150 and rejected hyper-technical rules benefiting clever 
lawyering at the expense of justice. Should a court read Twombly and Iqbal in a 
manner that would gut those underlying values? The question is rhetorical. 
While that question is rhetorical, it suggests another avenue of discussion 
about the simulation—whether access to the courts is a good thing. No doubt, 
most of us support open access to courts with some hesitation. We may be 
familiar with cases where plaintiffs brought frivolous suits based on little 
investigation of the underlying factual claims.151 A discussion about access to the 
courts and its relationship to the rule of law is worth having. Like many members 
of the public, law students are not likely to appreciate that procedural rules are as 
important—if not more—in protecting legal rights than substantive law. They are 
not likely to recognize what many procedural scholars see as a war on procedure 
whereby the Court has used procedural devices to undercut substantive rights.152 
As you can see, a discussion of something that seems as mundane as a 
pleading standard can generate far-ranging inquiry about progressive values, 
access to courts, the rule of law, and more. Indeed, for those interested in 
globalizing the curriculum, you might expand the discussion by comparing the 
Federal Rules approach, the current approach in Iqbal, and the approach in 
European or Latin American courts.153 Beyond that, one might use Twombly and 
Iqbal as a springboard to discuss whether the Court exceeded its power when it 
substantially rewrote Rule 8(a)(2).154 
 
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
151. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Dupont Advance Fiber Systems, 303 F. Supp. 2d 766, 771 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(finding a claim of workplace racial discrimination “neither factually supported nor supportable” because the 
plaintiffs failed to allege a that the employer had a racially discriminatory policy and their claimed protected 
class, Southern Confederate Americans, was multiracial); Jones v. Int’l Riding Helmets, 49 F.3d 692, 696 (11th 
Cir. 1995) (upholding the district court’s award of Rule 11 sanctions to the defendant for factual insufficiency in 
a products liability action when the plaintiff’s attorney was aware the helmet at issue was made before the 
defendant company was founded). 
152. For a few examples of cases where the Court has made substantive changes through facially 
procedural holdings, see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 764 (2014) (finding personal jurisdiction 
lacking not on available forum non conveniens or reasonableness grounds, but by expanding Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011), to find that the defendant corporation here was “too big 
for general jurisdiction”); Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013) 
(upholding forum selection clauses on the assumption that they are a “bargained-for” provision in contracts, 
although in reality that is often a fiction between unequal parties). 
153. See, e.g., THOMAS O. MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2006). 
154. See, e.g., Cara Shepley, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: How the Supreme Court Rewrote Rule 8 to Immunize 
High-Level Executive Officials From Post-9/11 Liability (A Plausible Interpretation), 69 MD. L. REV. 
ENDNOTES 69, 70 (2010) (“[T]he Court engaged in an act of judicial fiat unprecedented in the context of Rule 
8.”) 
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This example is only the tip of the iceberg. Think about other examples from 
Civil Procedure where attorneys need to know theory to argue effectively. The 
scope of discovery provides an opportunity to discuss issues surrounding access 
to the courts, aggressive advocacy on behalf of one’s client, an attorney’s 
obligation to the court system, and deciding cases on the merits versus on the 
basis of clever avoidance, among many other issues.155 And then there are the 
Supreme Court’s new personal jurisdiction cases and what they reveal about 
protecting corporations from suit by narrowing available courts in which 
plaintiffs may sue.156 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Imagine being an assistant district attorney arguing before a sentencing judge 
concerning the appropriate sentence for an offender. You have made your 
recommendation for a sentence and the judge asks, “Why?” The question invites 
an answer that demonstrates an appreciation of theory and philosophy.157 As 
argued above, penological theory and the philosophy of punishment are 
imbedded in the law, both in statutes and case law.158 Teaching skills without 
teaching theory leaves the criminal lawyer without an important understanding of 
the law. 
Lest one think that example is an outlier, I offered a second example from 
Civil Procedure.159 At first blush, one might think that an attorney must only 
know a few basic rules to draft a complaint or to argue that the pleading is 
insufficient. And yet, as I have argued, determining the adequacy of pleading 
may open an inquiry into important values about access to the courts and other 
values at the core of our legal system.160 
  
 
155. See, e.g., Starcher, supra note 121, at 443. 
156. VITIELLO, ANIMATING CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 86. 
157. Supra Part II. 
158. Supra Part II. 
159. Supra Part III. 
160. Supra Part III. 
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Appendix 
In advance of “class,” review the following material and be prepared to 
discuss the questions indicated below: 
1.  Attached, you will find a probation report concerning a criminal 
defendant, Paul Weems. Review that report. 
2.  You are the law clerk to the judge before whom Weems’ case is 
pending. A jury has found the Defendant guilty of two counts of 
theft, but because the Defendant has a prior record, the judge may 
sentence him under the Three Strikes law. The judge has asked you 
to recommend an appropriate sentence in this case. Here is 
information that you need to be aware of: 
Defendant qualifies for one or two enhanced sentences under the state’s 
Three Strikes law. That is so because of his past history. Because the 
Defendant has previously been found guilty of three felonies under Penal 
Code, the Defendant is not eligible for probation. Under § 667, the court 
may “strike” one or more prior convictions, thereby avoiding a 25-year-
to-life sentence. If the court does not strike prior felonies, and because 
the mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years must run consecutively 
upon two convictions under § 667, the court must impose a minimum 
term of 50 years. If the court does strike prior felonies, the court may 
sentence the Defendant under § 487(a) (grand theft) or § 487(b) (petty 
theft). If the court strikes one or more prior conviction and treats this as 
felony theft, the court can impose a sentence of from 16 months to 3 
years in prison. If the court strikes one or more prior conviction and 
treats this as misdemeanor theft, the court can impose a sentence of up to 
six months in jail. As a result, the judge has discretion to sentence the 
Defendant from a minimum of six months in jail to a maximum of 50 
years to life. 
In making your recommendation, the judge wants you explain how you 
justify the sentence. Specifically, be able to explain whether your proposal is 
justified by reference to any of the various purposes of punishment set out in this 
state’s penal code. As explained in one case, the sentencing judge must consider 
several objectives in setting a sentencing: (a) the protection of society; (b) the 
punishment of the offender; (c) the encouragement of the offender to lead a law-
abiding life; (d) the deterrence of other potential offenders; (e) the isolation of the 
offender so that he cannot commit other crimes; (f) the opportunity for the victim 
to receive restitution from the offender; and (g) the requirement that the offender 
receive a sentence similar to those who are similarly-situated. In effect, the state 
law recognizes the traditional justifications for punishment: retribution, general 
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deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation or specific deterrence, as well as 
values of equality. 
3. Immediately below, you will find the probation report. 
James Buford 
Chief Probation Officer 
McGeorge County 
State of Pacific 
 
 Court No. YR-01-1978 
 Weems, Paul A. 
 
I. Present Offenses 
The following information is derived from McGeorge City Police 
Department Report #13-16989. 
On December 16, YR-01, Ed Randall, the head of security for the Two 
Dollar Store, called the police. Officer Lenard Anders responded to the call. 
Randall led Officer Anders to an interview room where store employees had 
detained the Defendant. Randall told Officer Anders that the store’s security tape 
recorded the Defendant in an act of shoplifting a number of DVDs and placing 
them into a backpack. Officer Anders arrested the Defendant and took him to 
McGeorge City Police Station, where he was booked and released. 
On January 3, YR-00, McGeorge City Police Officer Ernest Campbell was 
off-duty and working for the Two Dollar Store at 20 Miranda Boulevard when he 
noticed the Defendant in the music aisle of the store. The Officer knew of the 
Defendant’s criminal history and watched him as he slipped several CDs into his 
pants. The Officer detained him and called the McGeorge City Police 
Department. Officer Anders made the formal arrest and, because of the 
Defendant’s repeated criminal conduct, he booked the Defendant into jail on 
felony theft charges. The Defendant was arraigned on felony theft charges on 
January 4 and released on his own recognizance. 
After a jury convicted the Defendant on both counts of felony theft, the 
Honorable Judge Jay Knox ordered the matter to this office for a sentencing 
report. 
II. Defendant’s Statement 
During the pre-sentence interview, the Defendant was cooperative. He 
provided information about his background and current living conditions, 
including information about his long-standing addiction to heroin. He admitted 
taking the DVDs and stated that he was going to exchange them for heroin. 
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III. The Victims 
Consistent with Penal Code Sections 192.1 and 192.2, this office provided 
notice to the victim-businesses. The branch managers of both Two Dollar Stores 
were contacted via telephone. Neither is requesting restitution because the 
merchandise was recovered in both cases. 
IV. Criminal Record 
This office assembled the following information from the Defendant’s 
records at #A1978, FBI Record #56809 and prior probation reports #A4590 and 
#6670. 
 
Juvenile Convictions 
 
The Defendant had no prior determinations of delinquency when he was a 
minor. His contact with Pacific Juvenile Services relate to a placement in foster 
care when he was 8 years old, terminating when he was 12 years old. He was 
taken from his mother when she was sentenced to a 5-year term of imprisonment 
for prostitution and distribution of heroin. He was reunited with his mother upon 
her release. 
 
Adult: Prior Convictions 
 
In YR-13, the Defendant was convicted of a violation of first degree burglary 
under Penal Code § 460. He was sentenced to 2 years in prison and was released 
after serving 10 months. 
In YR-11, the Defendant was charged with one count of assault on a federal 
officer in federal court. He contended that he did not know that the officer, 
working undercover, was a federal officer. He pled guilty to resisting arrest and 
served a 4-month sentence. 
In YR-11, the Defendant was charged with possession of heroin under Health 
& Safety Code § 11356.1. He pled guilty and was sentenced to probation on the 
condition that he attend a state-run drug treatment program. 
In YR-11, the Defendant was arrested for possession of heroin. His probation 
was revoked and he was sentenced to 30 days in jail. 
In YR-10, the Defendant was convicted a misdemeanor theft under Penal 
Code § 484 and was sentenced to 14 days in jail and placed on probation for one 
year. 
In YR-10, the Defendant was arrested for multiple counts of attempted first 
degree burglary under Penal Code § 460. He pled guilty to 3 of those counts and 
was sentenced 84 months in prison. 
In YR-4, the Defendant was paroled from state prison. 
In YR-3, the Defendant was arrested for misdemeanor theft in Nevada where 
he lived briefly. He served 5 days in jail after pleading to that charge. 
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In YR-2, the Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor theft under Penal Code 
§ 484 and was sentenced to 60 days in jail. 
V. Social History 
The Defendant is 38 years old. He was raised by his mother; he does not 
remember ever having met his father. His mother was a prostitute and drug addict 
for as long as the Defendant can remember. As noted above, when he was 8 years 
old, he was made a ward of the state when his mother was incarcerated. 
Otherwise, his adolescent and early teenage years were unremarkable. 
The Defendant graduated from McGeorge High School in YR-20 and joined 
the US Army. He served in the Gulf War. He was injured in a non-combat 
accident. During his service in the Gulf War, he began using morphine, first to 
combat pain, but later illegally. He claims that other soldiers stole medical 
supplies and sold them to fellow soldiers. He was honorably discharged from the 
service in YR-15. 
Upon his return to civilian life, the Defendant secured a series of low-paid, 
low-skill jobs, including washing dishes and serving as a car-jockey at a large 
local dealership. He lost most of his jobs when he was caught stealing from his 
employers or when he failed to show up on a regular basis. His employers did not 
bother to pursue criminal charges in exchange for his agreement not to claim 
unemployment benefits. He admits that his poor job performance was a result of 
a heroin addiction that has plagued him since his discharge from the Army. 
His current crimes were drug related. The Defendant admits that he 
attempted to steal the DVDs so that he could exchange them for heroin. He 
commented that since YR-15, he has been drug-free for only a few months at a 
time, usually after he has entered drug treatment. But long term, he has not been 
able to stay free from drugs and recognizes that he often does stupid things when 
he becomes addicted. 
The Defendant was married briefly between his discharge from the Army and 
his first incarceration. His wife divorced him when he was in prison. His family 
consists of a son he had shortly after he joined the Army. He never married his 
son’s mother and has not stayed in touch with her. The son was born in YR-19 
and wants nothing to do with the Defendant. 
The Defendant claimed that he has no gang affiliation. There is no evidence 
to contradict that statement. 
 
